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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editors: Norman E. Johnson and Amory 0. Moore*
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 19381 provides for safety in air commerce
by establishing a nation-wide scheme of air traffic control in which federal
regulations govern air traffic throughout the country. Enforcement of the
regulations, called "air traffic rules," is the responsibility of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, and upon the policing of the airways by that
agency's Office of Safety Regulation depends the effectiveness of federal
air traffic control in the United States. During the infancy of aviation,
such control by a single agency was no doubt adequate. But today the
number of non-commercial fliers, among whom are most of the violators of
the air traffic rules, is increasing rapidly, and the already overburdened
Office of Safety Regulation, whose corresponding growth appears to have
been forestalled by an economy-minded Congress,2 has found itself unable
effectively to enforce the air traffic rules against them.
3
The obvious solution to the problem is to supplement federal air traffic
control with control by the police agencies of state and municipal govern-
ments. The Civil Aeronautics Administration has therefore begun to
encourage the imposition of punishment by the states, under their own
laws, upon persons flying aircraft recklessly within their jurisdictions.
This it has done, in cooperation with the National Association of State
Aviation Officials, by drafting and presenting to the state legislatures a
suitable "reckless-flying statute" and by participating in state programs
to train local police officers in its enforcement and that of other appropriate
local law.4
The plan of necessity assumes that, in spite of the extensive federal
regulation of safety in air commerce, the states retain a power to control
air traffic sufficient to enable them constitutionally to prohibit and punish
reckless flying over their territories. The purpose of this note is to deter-
mine the validity of that assumption. Because of the fact, however, that
the various state laws permitting local air traffic control are completely
without uniformity,5 the inquiry will be general rather than specific. The
* Journal Editors, Northwestern University Legal Publications Board.
1 52 Stat. 977 et seq., 49 USCA §401 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
2 See, e.g., the bitter debate over a $4,849,000 item for operating airport
traffic control towers proposed for inclusion in CAA's appropriation for fiscal year
1948. 93 Cong. Rec., May 14, 1947, at 5442 et seq.
3 See, for discussion of CAA's enforcement program, Elwell, Enforcement of
Safety Regulations, 14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 318, 327-330 (1947) ;
for discussion of the problem raised by increased non-commercial aviation and
decreased appropriations for CAA, Memorandum to Joint Committee on Federal-
State Relations from Assistant Counsel General, Safety, with attachments (CAB,
Jan. 3, 1947).
4 See Elwell, supra note 3, at 330-331; Plaine, State Aviation Legislation,
14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 333, 337-339 (1947); Air Safety En-
forcement Guide (CAA, Jan. 15, 1947). The guide is a manual used in the train-
ing of local police in the enforcement of state law in conformity with the air
traffic rules.
5 For Sections 13 and 14 of the State Aeronautics Commission or Depart-
ment Act, the "reckless-flying statute" recommended by CAA, and for Section 9
of the Uniform Aeronautics Act, see Appendix, infra. These statutes, as vari-
ously enacted and amended, are the most common statutory provision for local
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discussion will merely attempt to ascertain the extent of the power to
control air traffic retained in the hands of the state and municipal govern-
ments under the existing federal regulations.6
The doctrines of supersedure by federal law stem from the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. 7 National law made under Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce is exclusive, and the very fact of federal
regulation precludes state legislation which affects the activities regulated.
8
This is true even when the activities regulated are wholly intrastate.9
Supersedure does not depend upon conflict between the provisions of the
state and the federal regulations, for the former are void even if identical
to the latter. 10 Nor will the state legislation be sustained because it was en-
acted to protect different interests from those protected by the federal regu-
lations. 1 State legislation affecting a federally-regulated activity is valid
only to the extent that Congress has granted its express or implied consent
to state control. 12
The discussion of the extent of permissible state air traffic control thus
requires two determinations. The federal air traffic rules are a series of
administrative regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
They purport to regulate all flights of all civil aircraft, and are on their
face comprehensive measures in the full exercise of the Board's power.' 3
Such exercise of its power by a rule-making agency precludes state regu-
lation, even of activities left unregulated by the agency, within the field
delegated to it.14 It is first necessary, then, to examine the terms of the
grant of regulatory power to the Board to determine if they are broad
enough to permit the prohibition of all acts of reckless flying, no matter
where or by whom committed. 15 If they are not that broad, the states may
air traffic control. But in the states where those or similar statutes have not
been enacted, local air traffic control depends upon the enforcement against reck-
less fliers of the vehicle codes-if the definition of the term "vehicle" is broad
enough to include aircraft-and disorderly conduct statutes. See note (1938)
9 Air L. Rev. 390.
6 It is entirely possible that the discussion of this note will soon be of his-
torical interest only, for the CAB has proposed legislation to Congress conferring
upon the states concurrent power to enforce the federal air traffic rules. Mem-
orandum, supra note 3. There is no doubt that Congress may confer that power
upon the states. See note 12, infra. Language in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947), even indicates that concurring legislation by the states may not be nec-
essary. See note (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 972. But it seems probable that
before the proposed legislation is in fact enacted, and before either all states
have enacted concurring legislation or the fact that concurring legislation is not
necessary is squarely determined, the power of the states to enforce local law
against reckless fliers will have been in issue many times.
7 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
S Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
Recent supersedure cases are discussed in note (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 262.
9 See Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-231 (1947).
10 Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 (1915) ; 'see
Charleston, etc., R. Co. v. Varneville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) ("Coincidence
is as ineffective as opposition").
11 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
12 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945); see
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 47 Col. L. Rev. 547, 552-560
(1947).
13 See appendix, infra, where four typical air traffic rules are quoted.
14Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) ; see Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. NYLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 772-775 (1947).
15 The constitutionality of Congress' power to establish air traffic rules gov-
erning all flights of all civil aircraft in the United States is assumed. Early
doubts that the power to regulate interstate commerce included the power to
regulate remote intrastate flights of private aircraft [see, e.g., Fagg, Legal Basis
of the Civil Air Regulations, 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, 7, 27
(1939)] seem to have been dispelled by United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110 (1942) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See Ryan,
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
prohibit the reckless flying over which the Board has no control. Second,
it is necessary to determine the extent to which Congress has consented
to state action against reckless fliers within the field delegated to the Board.
I. THE EXTENT OF THE REGULATORY POWER DELEGATED TO THE BOARD.
When Congress, by Section 3(e) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926,16
granted the Secretary of Commerce the power to promulgate air traffic
rules, it made that power as extensive as it could. It provided extrinsically
that the rules govern all flights of all civil aircraft, and further stated its
inteht that the power to make the rules, which were to relate ". . . to the
same subjects as those covered by navigation rules and the various State
motor vehicle codes," was to be given the broadest possible construction by
the courts.17
The power to promulgate air traffic rules vested in the Civil Aeronautics
Board is granted in very similar terms and appears to be equally broad.
Section 601(7) of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides that "[tihe Board is
empowered ... to promote safety of flight in air commerce by prescribing
. . . air traffic rules for aircraft . . . "18 Whether or not the term "air
commerce" 19 is broad enough to include remote intrastate flights of non-
commercial aircraft, and there is authority to the effect that it is,20 the
grant of power-extends beyond any narrow definition of air commerce to
apply to all flights of all civil aircraft in the United States. 21 And it remains
as broad, in the sense of the number of different kinds of activities per-
missibly regulated thereunder, as it was under the Air Commerce Act.22
Economic Regulation of Air Commerce, 31. Va. L. Rev. 479, 495-500 (1945);
compare comment (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 359. In this connection, it
seems apparent that the effect of our ratification of the Internaticnal Civil Avia-
tion Convention upon the power of local governments to control air traffic will be
only indirect. Legislation in implementation of a treaty, under the doctrine of
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), is of course far more extensive than
legislation enacted, for example, under the commerce power. Thus Congress
under a treaty may regulate intrastate activities constitutionally beyond the reach
of federal control under the commerce power. See Seago & Furman, Internal
Consequences of International Air Regulation, 12 U. Chi. L. Rev. 333, 340-346
(1945). But here the commerce power is already sufficiently extensive to permit
federal regulation of all flights of all civil aircraft. Therefore without a change
in existing federal statutes to implement its policies, ratification of the treaty
will not affect local air traffic control. In view of our obligation under Article
XII of the Convention to keep our air regulations uniform with international
regulations, Congress may of course see fit to withdraw its consent to inde-
pendent local air traffic control (see Section II, infra). But since that obliga-
tion can be met by administrative revision of the air traffic rules, other changes
in the existing federal aircraft regulatory statutes seem unlikely.
1044 Stat. 570.
17 H.R. Rep. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 12. See dissenting opin-
ion of Black, J., and note thereto, in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 273
(1946).
18 52 Stat. 1007 (1938), 49 USCA §551 (7) (Supp. 1947).
19 Defined by Section 1(3) of the Act to include ". . . any operation or navi-
gation of aircraft which directly affects, or may endanger safety in, interstate,
overseas, or foreign air commerce." 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 USCA §401(3)
(Supp. 1947).
20 United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D.C. Nev. 1944).
21 Because air commerce follows no definite arteries of transportation, as
does surface commerce, and because of the speed and mobility of modern aircraft
and the great effect of weather conditions upon their courses, any aircraft in
flight represents a hazard to air commerce as defined. See H.R. Rep. No. 784,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), 8-10.
22 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), note (1947) 14 JOURNAL OF
AiR LAW AND COMMERCE 112. Although the power to promulgate air traffic rules
was discussed in the dissent, id., at 273, the majority, seemed to assume that the
power was vested in CAB under the same conditions that it had been vested in the
Secretary of Commerce by Section 3 of the Air Commerce Act.
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Under Section 601(7), the Board presumably has the power to forbid any
unsafe or reckless flying act committed by any civil aircraft flying any-
where in the country. Promulgation of the air traffic rules therefore
excludes the states, in the absence of congressional consent, from the
exercise of air traffic control.
II. EXPRESS CONSENT TO STATE ACTION.
Whatever power to control air traffic that the states have by express
consent of Congress was granted them by Section 4 of the Air Commerce
Act of 1926, under which they have the power to " . . . set aside and
provide for the protection of necessary airspace reservations . . . "23 The
extent of that power has apparently never been judicially defined. 24 It will
therefore be examined here at some, length.
The power to reserve airspace is the power to exclude aircraft from
the air over a specified area of ground. 25 Since the air navigation within
a federal airspace reservation is subject to the restrictions imposed by the
Executive order creating it,2 6 it must be presumed that the air navigation
within a state airspace reservation is likewise subject to the restrictions
imposed by the legislation creating it. It would seem, then, that Section 4
permits establishment of state air traffic control systems within whatever
airspace they reserve.
The terms of the grant of Section 4 restrict the states' exercise of
the power to reserve airspace only by providing that state reservations
will not conflict with civil airways or with reservations made by the Federal
Government. It would not be inconsistent with the terms of that section
for the states to set up independent systems of air traffic control governing
-all air not federally reserved. Such action would of course defeat the
purpose of the legislation providing for federal aircraft regulation.
27 It
is a familiar principle of statutory construction that the intent of the
whole act will control, and that all the parts should be interpreted as
subsidiary and harmonious. 28 The states' power to regulate air traffic is
therefore necessarily restricted by legislative intent and by inconsistent
provisions of the statutes.
Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act declared a "... public right of free-
dom of air transit in interstate and foreign air navigation in the navigable
airspace." 29 The congressional intent was to create a right similar to the
public right of navigation upon navigable waters.30 The latter right entitles
23 The full text of Section 4 is: "The President is authorized to provide by
executive order for the setting apart and protection of airspace reservations in
the United States for national defense or other governmental purposes and, in
addition, in the District of Columbia for safety purposes. The several States
may set apart and provide for the protection of necessary airspace reservations
in addition to and not in conflict either with airspace reservations established
by the President under this section or with any civil or military airway under
the provisions of this subchapter." 44 Stat. 570, 49 USCA §174 (Supp. 1947).24 Connecticut's system of air traffic control, apparently based in part on air-
space reservations, is discussed in Morris, State Control of Aeronautics, 11
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 320 (1940). See discussion of federal power
to reserve airspace in Ingall8, Air-man Certificate, 1 CAA 512 (1939).
25 52 Stat. 978 (1939), 49 USCA §401(9) (Supp. 1947). See H.R. Rep. No.
1262, 68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1925), 13 (examples of the purposes for which fed-
eral airspace reservations may be made).
26 H.R. Rep. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 14.
27-... Congress can not effectively 'foster, protect, control, and restrain'
interstate and foreign commerce by air if . . . federal rules of the air .. .do not
extend to all navigation in the navigable airspace.... The danger of diverse rules
of the air, including traffic rules and signals, is obvious ... " H.R. Rep. No.
1262, 68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1925), 15.
28 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §4704 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
29 44 Stat. 574 (1926).
50 H.R. Rep. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 14.
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the public as a group to free and reasonable use of the water for all legiti-
mate purposes of travel and transportation and, it is suggested, to freedom
from unreasonable governmental interference with such travel and trans-
portation.31 Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Act recognized " . . . in
behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of
transit in air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United
States."3 2 That right is, of course, directly opposed to the power of the
states to reserve airspace, and must be taken as limiting that power.33
Prior to the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, there was a
discussion on the floor of the Senate in regard to the extent of the power
granted the states by Section 4.34 It was there made clear that the power
was granted primarily to enable the states to protect their citizens from
injury by falling aircraft. The Senators felt that it was entirely reasonable
that the states exclude aircraft from the air over urban areas or, alterna-
tively, prescribe minimum altitude rules for aircraft flying over such areas.
They further indicated that permissible state regulation could be in con-
flict with federal regulations, and accordingly pointed out that the states
were denied the power to enact "rules of the road"- obvious examples are
signal rules and rules designed to prevent collisions between aircraft-
"which must be uniform if we are to have safety in the air."
The conclusion follows, therefore, that the power to reserve airspace
conferred upon the states by Section 4 permits them to enact and enforce
air traffic rules of their own under the following conditions:
(1) such rules must be reasonably calculated to protect persons and prop-
erty on the ground from danger from the air;
(2) they must be limited to the air over areas where there are such
numbers of persons and accumulations of property that their imposition
is justified;
(3) they must not unreasonably otherwise interfere with the public right
of freedom of transit in air commerce; and
(4) the activities that they regulate must be appropriate for non-uniform
regulation without danger to air commerce.
Those restrictions, coupled with the restrictions imposed by the terms
of Section 4 itself, make it clear that the air traffic control permitted
the states under their power to reserve airspace is extremely limited. It
was apparently fairly extensive at its inception, inasmuch as it permitted
enforcement of non-uniform statutes even against interstate carriers.3
But as air commerce has grown, and as airports have developed, the skies
over the cities have become crossed and recrossed with civil airways. And
as the only airspace which the states could permissibly reserve under con-
dition (2) was preempted by the Federal Government, the scope of air
traffic control permitted the states under Section 4 has diminished until
it is now virtually non-existent. Certainly it cannot support the extensive
enforcement of reckless flying statutes now desired by federal aviation
authorities.
III. IMPLIED CONSENT TO STATE ACTION.
It can be argued, however, that Congress has impliedly consented to
state air traffic control measures regulating intrastate air traffic conform-
ably with the federal air traffic rules. That argument is based on the
distinction between punitive and remedial sanctions drawn by the Supreme
31 1 Farnham, Water and Water Rights, §§27, 28 (1904).
3252 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 USCA §403 (Supp. 1947).
33 "Words or phrases may be enlarged or restricted to harmonize with other
provisions of an act .... " 2 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 28, §5706.
34 67 Cong. Rec. 9355 (1926).
35 Ibid.
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Court in Helvering v. Mitchell3 6 and reiterated in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess.3 7 These cases upheld, against defenses of double jeopardy,
exactions of money penalties in civil proceedings against persons who had
been acquitted in previous criminal trials for the same acts of fraud against
the government. Reasoning from the premise that "Congress may impose
both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission;
for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempt-
ing a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense," 38 the Court
met the defenses of double jeopardy by finding that the subsequent civil
suits for money penalties did not attempt to impose criminal punishments
upon defendants. Such penalties, imposed to indemnify the government for
losses sustained by the frauds and for the expenses of the -investigation,
were held to be "remedial" sanctions in the nature of money damages and
different from "punitive" damages in the nature of fines imposed to punish
the fraud-feasors. The two cases left no doubt that the difference was one
of kind, not one of degree. 39 It is a perhaps not unwarranted extension of
their reasoning to argue that the failure of Congress to provide criminal
punishment for acts in violation of the air traffic rules gives the states
an implied consent to impose criminal punishment for such acts instead.
The Civil Aeronautics Act provides two sanctions to be applied against
violators of the air traffic rules: a civil penalty of a variable sum of
money 4o and revocation, suspension, or limitation of the federal certificates
held by them.41 There is thus provided an integrated non-punitive plan of
enforcement by remedial sanction in which the certificates of dangerous
and incompetent fliers are controlled to protect air commerce and the
public42 and in which the costs of enforcement are recovered in civil suits
against them. 43 Because fliers cannot legally fly without the required
federal certificates, 44 which of course are not susceptible to non-federal
control, such a plan is a necessary adjunct to the general plan of federal
aircraft regulation. It does not, however, do what Congress had within
its power to do-provide criminal punishment for violators of the rules. 45
It is obvious that some reckless flying practices are so disregardful of the
safety of air commerce and of persons on the ground that criminal punish-
ment of the fliers involved is appropriate. Can Congress be said to have
denied the states the right to impose such punishments?
36 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
37317 U.S. 537 (1942).
38 Helvering v.' Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1942).
39 In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1942), the
Court stated that the civil penalty imposed might subject defendant to punish-
ment "... only in a certain and very limited sense." That, of course, is a long
way from admitting that the civil penalty was punishment which, because it did
not involve imprisonment, was of a degree not requiring that defendant be
granted the procedural' safeguards of a criminal trial. See Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 402-404 (1938). The Court was apparently answering the argu-
ment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the defense of double jeopardy would be
better met by considering the sanctions imposed by the two proceedings as two
separate parts of a single punishment, acceptance of which would have required
just such an admission. See Frankfurter, J., concurring, in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, supra, at 553 et seq.
40 52 Stat. 1015 (1939), 49 USCA §621(a) (Supp. 1947).
41 52 Stat. 1011 (1938), 49 USCA §559 (Supp. 1947).
42 See Brown v. Civil Aeronautics Authority, 112 F. 2d 737 (C.C.A. 9th,
1940). License revocation is of course a remedial sanction. See Meffert v. Medi-
cal Board, 66 Kan. 710, 714, 72 Pac. 247 (1903), aff'd per curiam, Meffert v.
Packer, 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
43 52 Stat. 1017 (1938), 49 USCA §623(b) (Supp. 1947).
44 52 Stat. 1012 (1938), 49 USCA §560(a) (2) (Supp. 1947).
45 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (violation of administra-
tive rules may be made a crime).
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This argument cannot be answered by saying that Congress, by fail-
ing to provide criminal sanctions, has shown an intention that violators
of the air traffic rules should not be punished criminally. In the first place,
Congress did not provide criminal sanctions primarily because it did not
wish to clutter the federal courts with criminal prosecutions for infractions
of the air traffic rules. 40 In the second place, the Supreme Court requires
that Congress, when legislating under the commerce power, manifest clearly
an intent to preclude the states from enacting legislation designed to
protect the safety of the public. 47 It is admitted that both of the remedial
sanctions used to enforce the air traffic rules have been used to punish
violators of other regulations promulgated by the Board, in that they have
been 'applied in cases where they have had no relation either to the costs
of investigation 48 or to the protection of air commerce and the public, 49
but it seems clear that the theoretical distinction between punitive and
remedial sanctions cannot be invalidated merely because remedial sanctions
may sometimes be misapplied.
By the same line of reasoning, the federal air traffic rules do not
prohibit the enforcement of municipal ordinances against reckless fliers.
Although, by the weight of authority, violations of municipal ordinances are
not crimes,5" fines imposed for such violations are probably punitive sanc-
tions and imposed solely to punish the violators. 51 If the failure of Congress
to provide criminal punishment for violators of the air traffic rules permits
punishment to be imposed upon them by the states, it must also permit
their punishment by municipalities.
Because of the importance to air commerce that federal certificates be
subject to revocation, suspension, and limitation by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, prosecution of reckless fliers by the states could not be tolerated
if it barred subsequent proceedings by the Board. It is well settled, how-
ever, that when the same act is forbidden by state and federal law, its
commission is two distinct offenses, one against the United States and one
against the state; both governments may then prosecute the committer of
the act without infraction of the constitutional rule against double jeopardy,
which forbids only repeated prosecutions for the same offense. 52 Similarly,
both the United States and a municipality may prosecute the committer of
an act forbidden by both federal law and municipal ordinance. 53 Air traffic
control by local governments, then, insofar as it may be exercised, is con-
current with that of the Federal Government. 54
In the majority of states, the committer of an act forbidden by both
state statute and municipal ordinance may be prosecuted by both govern-
46 See Lee, Air Commerce Act of 1926, 12 A.B.A.J. 371, 375 (1926).
47 See Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
48See e.g. CAB v. Northwest Airlines, 69 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. Minn. 1946)
(suit for civil penalty because pilot refused CAA inspector admission into pilot's
compartment while aircraft was in flight).
49 See e.g., Peters, Airman Certificate, 5 CAB 479 (1943) (commercial pilot's
certificate suspended for 6 months because holder assaulted CAA inspector).
50 Clark & Marshall, Law of Crimes, 2 (4th ed., Kearney, 1940). The reason
given is not that the ordinance imposes a remedial sanction, but that it is not a
public law, and that the punishment is not imposed by the state.
51 In Missouri, for example, where the courts are definitely committed to the
holding that violation of a municipal ordinance is not a crime, see Canton v. Mc-
Daniel, 188 Mo. 201, 228, 86 S.W. 1092 (1905), municipalities are nevertheless
required to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. Stanberry v. O'Neil
(Mo. App. 1912), 150 S.W. 1104.
52 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (prior conviction by state
court not bar to federal prosecution) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926)
(pending prosecution by United States not bar to state prosecution).
53 United States v. Peterson, 268 Fed. 864 (W.D. Wash. 1920).
54 See Wallis, Airman Certificate, 5 CAB 87, 91 (1941).
JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
ments.55 Thus in most states reckless fliers may be subject to three, and
in all states subject to two, sanctions for each act of reckless flying. This
fact brings about the primary restriction on the power of local govern-
ments to control air traffic. The Supreme Court would almost certainly
hold that it would be an undue burden on interstate commerce to subject
interstate carriers to multi-governmental prosecutions for the same act of
reckless flying.56 Air traffic control by local governments, then, is probably
limited to non-commercial aircraft only. It is further the rule that, when
Congress has legislated so as to have established a policy, state regulation,
even of intrastate activities not specifically within the field of congressional
regulation, which is contrary to that policy is void. 57 The statutes and
ordinances, then, by which local governments may enforce air traffic control
must be in conformity with the federal air traffic rules.
If the foregoing argument is valid, the states and municipalities have
this power to control air traffic: they may enact statutes and ordinances
identical to the federal air traffic rules or sufficiently like them so that
there is no conflict. A change in the air traffic rules would make conflicting
local law void. Those laws may be enforced by punitive sanction and against
non-commercial fliers only, but anywhere in the state without regard either
to civil airways or to the location of the termini of the flight during which
the violation occurred. It is submitted that only by this line of reasoning
may the extensive supplementary air traffic control desired by the federal
aviation authorities be sustained.
THERON L. RATHJE*
APPENDIX
TYPICAL STATE STATUTES EXPRESSLY DESIGNED TO CONTROL AIR TRAFFIC:
1. UNIFORM AERONAUTICS ACT, §9: "Any aeronaut or passenger who, while in
flight over a thickly inhabited area or over a public gathering within this state,
shall engage in trick or acrobatic flying or any acrobatic feat, or shall, except
while landing or taking off, fly at such a low level as to endanger the persons on
the surface beneath, or shall drop any object except loose water or loose sand
ballast, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... [and punished by fine or imprison-
ment]." 11 Uniform Laws Ann. 164.
This statute is now in force, usually with some slight modification, in the
following states: Ariz. Code (1939) §48-115; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §5784;
Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935) §6983; Md. Code (1939) Art. IA §9; Minn. Stats.
(1945) §360.075 (14, 15) ; Mo. Rev. Stats. (1939) §15112; N.J. Stats. Ann. (1937)
§6:2-11; N.C. Gen. Stats. (1943) §63-18; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §2-0310;
S.C. Code (1942) §7108; S.D. Code (1939) §2.9902; Tenn. Code (1938) §2724;
Vt. Pub. Laws §§5245-5247.
2. STATE AERONAUTICS COMMISSION OR DEPARTMENT ACT §13: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person to operate an aircraft in the air, or on the ground or
water, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other habit-
55 State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363, 246 Pac. 758 (1925); see
Kneier, Prosecution Under State and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy,
16 Corn. L.Q. 201 (1931).
56 Cf. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912). State statutes whose
provisions are identical to those of a federal law are of course void. Cases cited
supra, note 10. Such cases go off on the grounds of national supremacy, but
there seems to be no other logical grounds for the application of the doctrine in
cases where the two regulations are identical than the obvious one that it relieves
interstate commerce of the burden of serving two masters. See note (1946) 60
Harv. L. Rev. 262, 265.
57Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); see Southern Pacific.R. Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
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forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air, or on the ground or water,
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
In any proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation
of this section, the court in determining whether the operation was careless or
reckless shall consider the standards for safe operation of aircraft prescribed
by federal statutes or regulations governing aeronautics.;' Air Safety Enforce-
ment Guide 3 (CAA, Jan. 15, 1947).
This statute is now in force in the following states: Cal. Laws (1947) C.
1379 §13; Conn. Laws (1946) H.B. 2-X §30; Idaho Laws (1947) S.B. No. 66,
§12; Md. Laws (1947) C. 896 §92; N.D. Laws (1947) C. 1, §9; Nev. Laws (1947)
C. 114; §§1, 2; Okla. Laws (1947) S.B. No. 214, §9; Ore. Laws (1947) C. 328,
§4; S.D. Laws (1947) C. 3; Tenn. Laws (1947) C. 132; Wash. Laws (1947)
C. 165, §22; W. Va. Laws (1947) S.B. No. 120 §§11, 12.
3. STATE AERONAUTICS COMMISSION OR DEPARTMENT ACT, §14: (a) "It shall be
unlawful for any person to operate or cause or authorize to be operated any civil
aircraft within this state unless such aircraft has an appropriate effective cer-
tificate, permit, or license issued by the United States. It shall be unlawful for
any person to engage in aeronautics as an airman in this state unless he has an
appropriate effective airman certificate, permit, rating, or license, issued by the
United States authorizing him to engage in the particular class of aeronautics
in which he is engaged, if such certificate, permit, rating, or license is required
by the United States."
(b) "Where a certificate, permit, rating, or license is required for an airman
by the United States, it shall be kept in his personal possession when he is oper-
ating within the state and shall be presented for inspection upon the demand of
any police officer, or any other officer of the state or of a municipality or mem-
ber, official, or employee of the commission authorized pursuant to Section 21 of
this Act to enforce the Aeronautics Laws, or any official, manager, or person in
charge of any airport upon which the airman shall land, or upon the reasonable
request of any other person. Where a certificate, permit, or license is required
by the United States for an aircraft, it shall be carried in the aircraft at all
times while the aircraft is operating in the state, shall be conspicuously posted
in the aircraft where it may be readily seen by passengers or inspectors, and
shall be presented for inspection upon the demand of any peace officer, or any
other officer of the state or of a municipality or member, official, or employee of
the commission authorized pursuant to Section 21 of this Act to enforce the
Aeronautics Laws; or any official, manager, or person in charge of any airport
upon which the aircraft shall land, or upon the reasonable request of any other
person." Air Safety Enforcement Guide 3 (CAA, Jan. 15, 1947).
This statute is now in force in the following states: Cal. Laws (1947) C.
1379, §14; Idaho Laws (1947) S.B. No. 66 §13; Md. Laws (1947) C. 896 §93;
Nev. Laws (1947) C. 114, §§3-8; Okla. Laws (1947) S.B. No. 214 §10; Ore. Laws
(1947) C. 328 §§1-3; Wash. Laws (1947) C. 165 §23; W. Va. Laws (1947) S.B.
No. 120, §14.
The foregoing, having been appended for illustrative purposes, is not in-
tended to be a complete compilation of state law providing for local air traffic
control. It does not include, for example, the many states in which statutes sim-
ilar to Section 13 of the State Aeronautics Commission or Department Act have
been enacted without the provision that the determination of careless or reck-
.less flying shall be made with reference to the standards of safe flying established
by federal regulation. Neither does it include those states which have amended
Section 9 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act to include one or more of the pro-
visions of Section 13 of the State Aeronautics Commission or Department Act,
or those states which have enacted the federal air traffic rules by reference.
